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Abstract 
Do workers financially gain by coming to New Zealand under the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy? This 
question among others attracted wide attention when the policy completed one year since implementation. Given that 
workers from the kick Start Pacific states work in a range of work settings, the Department of Labour undertook a 
sample audit ofRSE employers during mid-2008. The audit was considered a cost-effective method to provide reliable 
estimates o,(what workers potentially earned and their likely net returns afier costs and deductions. The results showed 
that on average workers had a net return of arozmd NZ$6, 000. This is early indicative evidence and note that the audit 
primarily covered a part o,(the year when the weather and H'Ork availability was more settled. 
Introduction 
Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy is an 
innovative international migration policy that explicitly 
attempts to achieve the n·iple wins for migrants and their 
counn·ies of origin and destination (Ramasamy et al, 
2008). This policy which highlights the role of migration 
and development emerged from a n·ipartite negotiation 
between New Zealand government. industry and the 
Pacific states and came into effect in April 2007. 
On the one hand, the RSE policy as a fulcrum for the 
Seasonal Labour Strategy aims to alleviate the problem of 
seasonal labom shortages in New Zealand's horticulture 
and viticulture industries and bring u·ansfonnative 
changes within these indusn·ies. On the other hand, it 
provides labom mobility options for people from Pacific 
Forum counn·ies and contributes to development 
outcomes for the sending counn·ies and the region. 
To ensure success and meet policy objectives in the 
longer-term, the RSE policy needs to provide sustainable 
benefits for workers, Pacific states, employers, and 
industry while preserving employment opportunities for 
New Zealanders. Fundamental to assessing these intended 
policy outcomes is gaining an understanding of how the 
policy benefits workers and employers in the short term 
and whether the costs of participating in this programme 
are outweighed by the benefits for both groups. One of 
the key outcomes for Pacific states' public service 
agencies relate to enabling their citizens to generate 
savings and acquire relevant experience. 
This paper attempts to provide limited and preliminary 
evidence relating to workers earnings and savings. More 
specifically the paper aims to describe the potential net 
retums for workers coming to New Zealand under the 
RSE policy and provide indications on whether 
pat1icipation is economically viable for these workers. 
Earnings and savings is one key outcome for workers 
atnong several others. 
Background 
Policy Requirements 
The RSE policy is designed to be facilitative for industry, 
ensme New Zealanders are given first opportunity for 
employment, manage immigration risk, and help increase 
labom productivity. A key element of the policy is to 
ensure there is a cost wedge between employing New 
Zealanders and accessing RSE workers (Government of 
New Zealand, 2006). As part of the Agreement to Recruit 
(ATR) 1 workers application, employers will also 
undertake specific responsibilities relating to their 
potential employees, including: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
a commitment to pay one half of the travel costs 
for the workers to fly to and from New Zealand 
a guru·antee of wages for at least 240 how·s of 
work, or an appropriate amount if the employment 
agreement is for less than 240 homs (i.e. for short-
tetm engagements) 
a guarantee of an average of at least 30 hours work 
per week 
evidence of specific provisions to address pastoral 
care matters (including accommodation, 
translation, transportation and induction to life in 
New Zealand, including providing oppmtunities 
for recreation and religious observance where 
appropriate) 
evidence that employees will be paid at least New 
Zealand market rates 
a commitment to pay for the costs associated with 
removal from New Zealand if workers become 
i !legal and are deported, and 
Labom, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 286 
• agreement to compliance, auditing and 
enforcement provisions. 
While imposing a cost wedge for employers, the policy 
provisions are intended to make it economically 
worthwhile for workers in that the costs do not dilute the 
development benefits. Therefore workers from the Kick 
Start states are allowed to stay up to seven months within 
any 11-month period. In December 2007, Cabinet agreed 
to an interim policy amendment to allow employers 
recruiting from Kiribati and Tuvalu to pay half the airfare 
from Fiji to New Zealand instead of the entire airfare 
form Tuvalu and Kiribati. To offset these costs, Cabinet 
agreed that those from Tuvalu and Kiribati may work in 
New Zealand for nine months instead of seven within the 
11-month period. 
Besides the above policy provisions, RSE workers are 
covered by prevailing employment standards that New 
Zealanders enjoy. The labour inspectors are responsible 
for assisting employers (including contractors) to meet 
employment relations standards, monitoring and reporting 
on workplace conditions and health and safety issues2. 
The RSE Labour Inspector has a role in ensuring that the 
provisions of Employment and Health and Safety based 
legislation have been met. There are various Acts of 
Parliament that have application to the RSE workplace 
and the main Acts (Holidays Act 2003 etc) and best 
practice devised by the labour inspectorate are 
swnmarised in Appendix A. 
Progressive Reviews 
Since the beginning of the year the RSE policy had been 
under public scrutiny with mixed accounts of worker and 
employer experiences of the policy. Some were positive 
in finding that the general sense in the industry and in the 
government agencies responsible that the policy was 
working reasonably well (Courtney, 2008). In Vanuatu 
John Hammond and John Connell reported that ' there 
have at least been clear income gains, though it is not yet 
possible to indicate what these have been used for, but 
they appear to be focused on a development agenda' 
(2008:14). One rep011 that what the seasonal workers 
earned in New Zealand net of expenses in the less than 
one year they spent there was more than what they would 
have eamed back in their home nations. For a nation like 
Vanuatu, which unlike other Pacific Islands has no 
• 
remittance revenue channel to speak of, the RSE policy 
was .expected to have opened a whole new opportunity, 
eammg for the economy as much as 55 million Vatu 
(equivalent to approximately A$670,500) in the frrst year 
alone3 • 
Some reports acknowledged the overall success but also 
raised questions over the working of aspects of the 
scheme. Poor housing, lack of work at down times 
contracts being set by piece rate at minimum wage rathe; 
than m.arket rates and workers not being fully informed of 
deductions were some of the issues highlighted in a study 
by Nic Mcllelan (2008). 
Against this general background of mixed messages, the 
Department was required to collect information on the 
actual living and work conditions for RSE workers. This 
was achieved through an audit exercise of pastoral care 
and work conditions undertaken by RSE labour 
inspectors. This audit provided the information and data 
for this paper. 
How did the audit fit into the evaluation 
strategy? 
The Department's evaluation strategy for RSE comprises 
three internal strands - monitoring of key activities and 
outcomes, real-time evaluation feedback loops to 
augment operational activities to refine RSE processes 
and activities over time and formal evaluation study of 
aspects of RSE polic/. The Department through its 
external research partners' - Waikato University and The 
World Bank - supports the evaluation of development 
outcomes for the participating Pacific states. The formal 
evaluation forms the core with the other strands both 
internal and external informing this. 
Labour inspectors as indicated earlier are tasked with 
assessing employers' compliance with RSE policy, which 
includes the employment and training of New Zealanders, 
payment of market rates and provision of pastoral care. 
They are expected to be involved in a three-stage audit 
cycle for every RSE employer from the time of 
accreditation on through to completing the period of 
employment specified in an Agreement to Recruit. This 
inbuilt repm1ing and audit function provided evaluation 
with an opportunity to gather information around pastoral 
care and work conditions. Consolidating monitoring data 
from existing operations has meant efficient sharing of 
available information resources across the Department 
and to provide a shared understanding of emerging issues 
for policy and delivery to address in a timely manner. 
Methodology 
The information gathered included the audit of pastoral 
conditions for all RSE employers that had workers in 
New Zealand at the time (phase 1) and an audit of wages, 
hours, costs and or deductions (phase 2). This study is 
based on data collected from phase 2 involving 17 RSE 
employers. The first iteration of phase 2 had covered 12 
RSE employers. The analysis results for 12 and 17 RSE 
employers do not change much but the increased numbers 
mean the range varies more and there is a better 
understanding of the distribution of wages, hours, costs 
and deductions. 
Sample 
An entire audit of all wage records by labour inspectors 
would have involved physically inspecting 70,000 
records. Given the enormity of this task, the agreed 
approach was to obtain a sample of some RSE employers 
according to the following criteria: 
• Select a single A TR for each RSE employer 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 287 
• 
• 
A TRs with at least 30 workers where possible. 
The A TR duration had been between Sept 07 and 
June 08 
• Workers had completed the season and returned 
• A range of regions and RSE employer types 
covered 
• Based on the above criteria, IMSED Research 5 
provided a sample of 18 RSE employers across 8 
regions for auditing. 
There were only 6 RSE employers who had 30 or more 
workers for the A TR · s identi tied. Where workers per 
A TR were more than 30, the selection rule was to 
randomly sample 50% or 30 workers whichever number 
was greater. This was achieved in almost all cases. Only 
one RSE among the 18 identified could not be audited 
and a fma1 audit of 402 individual worker records were 
completed (Refer Appendix B). 
Dw·ing the RSE year 2007-08 (April 2007 - March 2008) 
the total number of RSE workers approved for work was 
3622. Of these 2646 were from the five Kick Start states 
of Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu6 and the 
majority from the first three states. A sample of 402 
meant that that a substantial number of workers in the 
population of interest in the Kick Statt States were 
covered. 
The I 7 RSE employers who took part in the audit were 
largely employers of seasonal la bow- from Samoa, Tonga 
and Vanuatu. It is reasonable to assume that the income 
opportunities and costs for the 407 workers covered by 
the audit are generally the same for workers from other 
Pacific states as well. 
Calculation of net returns 
The ea lculation of net returns attempted in this study does 
not present a fine grained pictw·e of net returns. Net 
income depends on a number of factors such as: Length 
of time. availability of "vorker during that time, 
Part 1 -Analysis of averages across tbe 17 RSEs 
Table 1: Average weeks and hours worked 
productivity of worker, morale of group of workers and 
their ability to adapt and settle down, standard of pastoral 
care, variability in workers' fixed and variable costs. 
Net returns/Balance = (Gross pay +Tax credit+ Holiday 
pay) - (PAYE + one off deductions (e.g. clothing, 
passport) & weekly deductions (e.g. food, transport). 
What this does not include is: a) complete upfront costs 
unless accounted for in weekly deductions and b) 
additional expenditure incurred in day-to-day living, 
pw·chase of consumer goods or capital items. 
The audit covered wages, hours and deductions and costs. 
However calculation of deductions is problematic for the 
following reasons: sometimes it is not known if payment 
is set up to come from worker account or in fact the 
expense is directly managed by the workers (e.g. food, 
o·ansport). Workers may be told the gross rates of pay, 
but not fully informed of all deductions by employers to 
cover housing, transport costs or recouping airfares. 
Therefore, this analysis focuses more on using the 
recorded wages and using a combination of actual 
deductions or assumed costs based on phase 1 audit of 
pastoral care, to aiTive at balance left or net returns, rather 
than on estimating levels of average deductions on a 
weekly basis. 
The information on wages does not distinguish between 
piece rates and hourly rates. 
Key findings 
The analysis is split into two parts. The first part is based 
?n analysis of the I 7 RSEs audited while the second part 
IS based on 402 individual workers (across the 17 RSEs)7• 
As information was coded differently and in some cases 
missing data replaced with imputed values, for the first 
part it is easier to base the analysis across the RSEs. 
However, a cross-check of results using RSE and 
individual worker records in pru1s 1 and 2 revealed there 
is not much difference. 
RSE type No of workers Period of work AVG Weeks A VG bours worked 
Grower 8 10 Apr 08 - Jul 08 11.00 
Grower 11 549.37 ")") Mar 08 - May 08 9.00 
Grower/ packhousc I 462.19 16 Apr 08 - Jun 08 11.00 506.06 Grower 11 13 Feb 08 - May 08 10.00 
Growcr 'packer I 383.30 20 Feb 08 - ~ lay 08 12.00 570.51 Grower 4 ")") Feb 08 - Apr 08 9.94 Grower 3 417.86 12 Feb 08 -May 08 
Grower 6 
11.42 445.09 
15 Feb 08 - Jun 08 
Grower 5 15.70 674.80 15 Jan 08 - Apr 08 15.57 
Grower 2 23 Sept 07 · Jan 08 
609.73 
Grower 10 15.14 726.86 30 Nov 07- Jun 08 11 .22 Contractor I 19 Sept 07 - Jun 08 
n.a 
Grower 13 19.00 691 .09 30 Dec 07 - Apr 08 
Grower 9 21 .00 786.50 30 Nov 07 - May 08 22 .98 Cooperative I n.a 50 Oct 07 - May 08 27.36 1141.02 Grower I 20 Oct 07 - Apr 08 
Grower 7 28 .55 1009.34 35 Nov 07 - May 08 
Un-wei~ted AVERAGE 26.30 1493.64 402 16.95 697.82 Weighted AVERAGE 402 18.48 659.69 
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Workers were employed for period of at least 9 weeks, 
with the maximum length of employment of over 28 
weeks. The average number of hours worked was 
dependent on the employment period and has an average 
Table 2: Average deductions and costs 
RSEtype One-off fixed 
costs 
of almost 660. Most workers number of working hours 
was close to the average however some (those employed 
for a longer number of weeks) worked for over 1000 
hours with a maximum of 1493. 
Weekly costs/deductions 
AVG one-off AVG weekly AVG weekly AVG weekly AVG weekly AVG Weekly 
Airfare Accommodation Food Transport to Health Total 
payment by and from work insurance 
worker 
Contractor 1 $249 $118 $41 $22 $12 $ 192 
Grower 9 $393 $95 $40 $42 $0 $177 
Grower 13 $400 $100 $36 $0 $11 $147 
Grower 1 $368 $110 $41 $10 $0 $161 
Grower 8 $1,091 $ 100 $50 $0 $11 $161 
Grower4 $298 $ 100 $41 $0 $11 $152 
Grower 11 $470 $ 100 $55 $9 $I I $175 
Grower 5 $672 $113 $41 $22 $11 $186 
Grower 12 $391 $ll0 $41 $0 $9 $I60 
Grower/packhouse 1 $413 $47 $41 $55 $11 $154 
Grower 2 $467 $85 $10 $26 $I I $131 
Grower 7 $0 $60 $54 $17 $0 $131 
Grower 10 $201 $80 $41 $5 $11 $137 
Grower 3 $77 $89 $4 1 $0 $9 $139 
Grower6 $1,330 $82 $41 $0 $11 $134 
Grower/packer I $225 $100 $41 $0 $6 $147 
Cooperative 1 $426 $70 $41 $0 $0 $111 
Uo-weighted average $439 $92 $41 $23 $10 $153 
• $41 was imputed based on average cost estimated from phase 1 audit. 
•• $0 indicates no transport costs were incurred (e.g. work place adjacent to accommodation) or no health insurance was paid. 
The cost of airfare showed considerable variation 
depending on the distance traveled from the source 
country. The weekly accommodation was less variable 
with 14 of the 17 worker groups falling between $80 and 
$118 per week. The remaining three were cheaper with 
the lowest cost being $47. The average weekly amount 
spent on food also showed little variation, with the 
Table 3: Average pay and taxes of workers 
RSE type A VG Gross Pay 
Grower 8 $6,980 
Grower 12 $5 ,787 
Grower/packhouse I $6,501 
Grower 11 $6,720 
Grower/packer 1 $7,421 
Grower4 $6,328 
Grower 3 $7,835 
Grower6 $8,918 
Grower 5 $8,887 
Grower 2 $10,865 
Grower 10 $11 ,988 
Contractor I $9,638 
Grower 13 $11,005 
Grower 9 $1I,253 
Cooperative I $15,278 
Grower 1 $15,377 
Grower 7 $17,398 
Un-weighted AVERAGE $9,893 
Weighted AVERAGE $10,755 
majority of workers spending the average of $41 per 
week8. Workers also spent an average of$23 per week on 
transport to and from work. The cost of health insw·ance 
was dependent on whether the worker had been provided 
access to health insurance. The average cost was $1 0 per 
week, although the majority of those who had insw·ance 
paid $11 per week. 
A VG Holiday pay AVG PAYE 
$558 $1,507 
$487 $1 ,372 
$520 $1,494 
$538 $1.622 
$594 $1.631 
$506 $I ,454 
$627 $1,932 
$660 $1,996 
$684 $1 ,991 
$808 $2 ,362 
$959 $2,616 
$771 $2, 184 
$922 $2,602 
$900 $2,494 
$1,226 $3.506 
$1,141 $3, I 09 
$1,333 $3,532 
$778 $2,200 
$849 $2,392 
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The average gross pay showed a wide range from over 
$5,787 to $17,398 while the weighted average across a ll 
employer types was $ 10,755. Holiday pay and PAYE 
varied in line with this disu·ibution. 
Table 4: Average balance or net returns for workers 
RSE type A VG Net returns 
Grower 8 $:2,871 
Grower 1:2 $3,008 
Grower/packhouse I $3,359 
Grower 11 $3,658 
Grower/packer I $3,738 
Grower 4 $3,774 
Grower 3 $4.204 
Grower 6 $4.299 
Grower 5 $4,739 
Grower 2 $5.466 
Grower I 0 $5,881 
Contractor I $6.054 
Grower 13 $6.21 7 
Grower 9 $6.265 
Cooperative I $7.843 
Grower I 58.710 
Grower 7 $11.864 
L'n·Y.cighted ,.\ VLRAGE $5,409 
Weighted AVERAGE $5,950 
As indicated earlier the Average balance or net returns 
was derived taking away the taxes. deductions and costs 
from gross pay earned. The net retwns showed 
considerable variation from $2,871 to $11,864, which 
gives a range that a worker might expect to eam after 
taxes and deductions. The weighted average was $5950. 
The first iteration of this audit comprising 12 RSE 
employers had placed the un-·weighted average net retwns 
at $5,765. 
From the data provided above. it would appear that 
workers averaged 36 how·s per week and earned around 
$16 per hour. This would indicate that the minimum 
requirement of the policy in tetms of weekly hours and 
holll"ly rates are being met on average. 
Part 2 - Analysis of individual worker 
returns 
This analysis based on indi\'idual records shows a better 
pictw·e of the distribution of net returns. As table 4 below 
shows there is reasonable variation even within individual 
RSE employers. For instance Cooperative I shows a 
minimwn of $1,704 and a maximill'TI of$ 10.173. Clearly 
the range varies more with the increase in nwnber of 
workers '"~thin a RSE.A fw1her analysis of the 
disn·ibution across the overall group of 402 workers was 
undertaken. 
This analysis shows as in table 5 below that the lower 
quarter of workers observed earnings were at $ 3, 707 and 
belo\\ and the upper quaner at $ 7. 779 and below and the 
median was $5.625. 
Table 5: Worker net returns across different RSEs 
RSE Mean M in Ma.s N 
Contractor I $6,054 $3,568 $10,161 19 
Cooperative I $7,843 $1,704 $ 10, 173 50 
Grower I $8.7 10 $3,123 $ 11 ,383 20 
Grower 10 $5,881 $3,752 $16.4 13 30 
Grower 11 $3,658 $2,023 $5 ,142 23 
Grower 12 $3,008 $1,718 $4,038 22 
Grower 13 $6,217 $2,288 $7,213 30 
Grower 2 $7,724 $3,525 $10,334 23 
Grower 3 $4.204 $2,764 $6,698 22 
Grower 4 $3,774 $2,690 $5,898 22 
Grower 5 $4,739 $3,652 $5,715 15 
Grower 6 $4,299 $3,567 $5,735 15 
Grower 7 $11,864 $3,666 $ 14,5 11 35 
Grower 8 $2.87 1 $2,364 $3.387 10 
Grower 9 $6.265 $4.033 $9,134 30 
Grower-packer I $3.738 $3,277 $4,390 20 
Growcr/packhouse I $3,359 $2,419 $3,665 16 
Table 6: Quantiles for Log normal distribution 
Percent Observed Estimated 
I $2.238 $2,095 
5 $2.774 $2,676 
10 $3.180 $3,086 
25 $3.707 $3.978 
50 $5.625 $5.382 
75 $7.779 $7,406 
90 $10.173 $9.981 
95 $12,0 18 $11.980 
99 $13,057 $16,976 
The average net return of $ 6,079 is quite close to the 
weighted average net retw-n of $ 5,950 referred to in 
Table 1. A standard deviation of $2,813 around the 
average net return mearts that two-thirds (68%) of the 
workers were able to obtain a net return ranging between 
$3,266 and $8.892. 
How does this snapshot compare to other information on 
income and savings? 
Earlier in 2008 the Internal Revenue Department (IRD) 
had provided an analysis of gross incomes earned by RSE 
workers. IRD undertook an analysis of RSE workers' 
gross income in order to develop an RSE tax code (to 
a,·oid the need for tax rebates or refunds for RSE workers 
who were ordinarily placed on the general income tax 
code). IRD took the average weekly eaming by country 
for RSE workers from two RSE employers: one large 
employer ·with workers from Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu and another with workers fi:om Kiribati for the 
week ending 30 April 2008. IRD noted that some RSE 
workers had worked for longer periods artd were more 
experienced. The IRD indicative findings are summarised 
in the table below. 
Table 7: IRD estimates of gross earnings for a limited 
sample of RSE workers 
Country High Low Average No of weeks 
worked 
Kiribat i $900.00 $600.00 $680.00 14 
Samoa $624.00 $443.66 $545.21 5 
I onga $660.56 $361.39 $556.57 3 
Yanuatu $621.62 $495 .55 $418.65 1 
ruvalu $612.84 $258.47 $403.93 7 
Source: IRD presentation, KSS Forum 2008 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 290 
Figure 1: LogNormal Distribution of worker net returns 
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IRD's analysis shows that for week ending 30 April 2008, 
workers in the sample who were from Kiribati were 
earning significantly more than those from other countries 
and workers from Tuvalu eamed the least. The IRD's 
information about the gross earnings for workers fi·om 
Kiribati and Tuvalu is generally in line with data about 
the range of gross eamings of the 402 workers that were 
included in the audit. In the absence of more detailed 
information, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
findings from the audit about eamings and net income 
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also apply in general to workers fi·om Kiribati and 
Tuvalu. except for the additional o·avel costs. 
A major study by the World Bank (Luthria et al 2006), 
which inf01med the development of the RSE policy. had 
undertaken a modeling of savings potential for seasonal 
workers. This work modeled wages, costs, tax 
obligations, and savings potential of Paci fie Island 
employed in horticultw·al jobs in Australia for periods of 
up to six months at a time to assess whether a scheme is 
potentially viable for both growers and migrant workers. 
Table 8: Summary of savings potential for off-shore seasonal workers 
AUD$ 
Scenario Weekly hours # Tax rate% Wor kers' share 6 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks 
of rued costs % 
I 40 29 100 
2 40 29 so 
3 40 29 0 
4 so 29 100 
5 50 29 50 
6 50 29 0 
7 40 13 100 
8 40 13 so 
9 40 13 0 
10 50 13 lOO 
11 50 13 50 
12 50 13 0 
Source: Luthria et al, 2006 
The above table is a summary of the savings potential of 
Pacific Islander workers using different assumptions for 
taxation, cost sharing, and working hours. Fwther this 
does not include upfront or ongoing living costs as 
covered in the New Zealand audit and therefore not 
-884 36 1.745 
-48 872 2,S8l 
788 1.708 3.417 
-251 I ,406 4.484 
585 2,242 5.320 
1.42 1 3,078 6.1 56 
-293 I ,316 4,304 
543 2,152 5,140 
1.379 2,988 5.976 
487 3,005 7.683 
1,323 3.841 8.51 9 
2,159 4,677 9,355 
comparable. However scenanos 2 and 8 have 
assumptions somewhat similar to the New Zealand 
scenario in tetms of 50% employer paid airfare and 40 
weeks of work. The main difference between scenarios 2 
and 8 is the tax rates of 29% and 13%. A crude midpoint 
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between both these scenarios provides a potential savings 
of A$ 2348 or NZ$ 2,730 (at 0.86 exchange rate). Once 
additional costs are factored this net return would drop 
further. This seems to indicate that these modeling 
estimates may have been conservative. 
The DoL as part of its internal workings at the time of the 
RSE policy development attempted estimating savings 
after tax and costs (accommodation, food, transport and 
50% airfare) earnings for 3 months at 60 hours per week. 
These workings covered a range of kick statt states and 
both h01ticulture and viticulture industries. The estimates 
ranged from around $4500 to $5500 and appear plausible 
in the light of the audit findings. 
Conclusions 
The audit data indicates that the average weekly hours 
and hourly rates are above the minimum prescribed in the 
policy. Further the indicative evidence that on average 
workers make net returns of around $ 6000 is some 
assw·ance that workers do economically gain from the 
RSE policy. It is also clear that for many workers their 
potential savings will fall below this average figure and 
that we do not have a complete picture of all costs. 
The calculation of net retwns is not a simple exercise. As 
indicated earlier besides worker characteristics the 
circumstances and factors that determine worker incomes 
can and do vary among crops. tasks and regions and 
across both horticulture and viticultw·e industries. 
Further the ability to make a net return is not guaranteed 
as reflected through issues around insufficient hours of 
work at times among some employers. Such problems 
may indicate employers' lack of experience with RSE 
policy and the demands of managing in new 
circumstances with greater responsibilities. Seasonal 
variations and weather volatility may further exacerbate 
the problems. 
This makes it all the more significant to obtain reliable 
estimates of net earnings where possible. The audit 
exercise provides one avenue for collecting such data 
notwithstanding the limitations. Even surveys may not 
yield accurate estimates given the issues around 
misunderstandings around deductions and poor recall of 
money n·ansactions apart from logistical difficult ies m 
administering such a survey among seasonal workers. 
Ideally an audit covering winter months would help 
assemble a more rounded picture of net earnings for 
workers. The current estimates as indicated earlier 
covered the months when the weather and work 
availability was relatively more settled. The key missing 
information however would continue to be the additional 
costs of living that workers incw- on a weekly basis. The 
smvey based evaluation of development outcomes by the 
Waikato University and World Bank may help flesh out 
the picture of net earnings fwther. Besides this 
evaluation will also help answer the counterfactual 
question of what workers may have earned in the absence 
of the RSE policy. It is also possible that when a RSE tax 
code is implemented by the IRD then better estimates of 
gross and post-tax earnings could be analysed from the 
Linked Employer Employee Data. 
Notes 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
RSE policy involves a four step process: 
employers gain accreditation and RSE status, 
employers lodge an A TR to recruit specific 
number of employees, workers lodge visa 
application and workers are deemed eligible to 
return the following season subject to conditions 
being met. 
Apart from dedicated immigration compliance 
staff, there are six RSE labour inspectors across 
the regions including a coordinator based in 
Wellington. 
http://www. islandsbusiness.com/islands _ business/i 
ndex dynamic/containerNameToReplace=Middle 
Middle/focusModuleiD= 18141 /overideSkinName 
=issueArticle-full. tpl 
Evaluation objectives aim at describing and 
assessing implementation, management of risks 
and short-tetm outcomes. 
International Migration, Settlement and 
Employment Dynamics Research is a part of the 
Workforce Policy Group, DoL. 
Fiji was dropped from this group of Pacific states 
following the 2006 coup in that country. 
Based on the predominant business activity, RSE 
employers are classified by the following types: 
Growers, Contractors, Cooperatives, 
Grower/packhouse and Grower/packer. 
8. Of the 17, only 6 had actual deductions and in the 
case of the balance the figure of $41 was imputed 
based on phase I audit. 
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Appendix A 
Holidays Act 2003 ensures all workers access standard 
entitlements. Under the RSE policy it is recommended 
that holiday pay is paid at 8% of their total gross eamings 
on termination of their employment. This will ensure that 
The Wages Protection Act 1983 sets out a number of 
fimdarnental rules relating to the payment of wages. 
Perhaps the most significant is that no deductions can be 
made from wages except in accordance with the Act. The 
RSE policy states that any deductions made, including 
deductions for accommodation, must not take a workers 
weekly pay below minimwn wage except where an 
employer has advanced payment to a worker to cover up 
to half the retwn travel cost. 
Appendix B 
Table 9: Identified and acbieved sample 
Region Employer Period of Employment Identified No of named Achieved 
sample records sample 
Bay of Plenty Grower/packhouse 1 31/03/2008-20/06/2008 40 15 16 
Grower 8 11 /05/2008-15/06/2008 15 15 10 
Canterbury Grower/packer 1 18/02/2008-24/05/2008 20 20 20 
Hawkes Bay Grower 12 18/02/2008-16/05/2008 22 22 22 
Grower 5 07/01 /2008-25/04/2008 35 38 15 
Grower 10 19/ 11/2007- 19/06/2008 30 30 30 
Contractor 1 0 1 I 12/2007-31/05/2008 20 19 19 
Grower 11 25/02/2008-30/04/2008 20 23 23 
Grower 9 19/ 11 /2007- 31/05/2008 50 51 30 
Grower 13 25/11/2007-30/04/2008 30 30 30 
Manuwatu Grower 2 20/09/2007-23/ 12/2007 23 23 23 
Mar I borough Contractor 2 03/12/2007-25/04/2008 30 ')'') 0 
Nelson Grower 6 18/02/2008-29/05/2008 20 16 15 
Grower 4 18/02/2008-05/05/~008 30 22 .,., 
Grower 3 18/02/2008-05/05/2008 25 22 22 
Grower? 01 / 1112007- 01/06/2008 35 35 35 
North land Grower 1 10/09/2007- 10/04/2008 20 20 20 
Otago CooEerative 1 22/10/2007- 19/05/2008 232 229 50 
Total=8 18 697 652 402 
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